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Defences in Unjust Enrichment: Questions and Themes 
 
Andrew Dyson, James Goudkamp and Frederick Wilmot-Smith 
 
I. Introduction 
 
This book is the second in a series of four that is concerned with defences to liability 
arising in private law. We felt, and still feel, that the topic has not received the attention 
that it deserves.1 We are not alone in holding this view.2 By contrast, defences have 
dominated the research agendas of many scholars of the criminal law.3 The asymmetry in 
attention to defences in these different fields is striking in part because of the apparent 
parallels between the two domains. For instance, the distinction in private law between 
causes of action and defences arguably mirrors that between offences and defences in the 
criminal law.4 
Our first book examined defences to tort claims.5 The present volume deals with 
defences to claims in unjust enrichment. The next two books will concern defences to 
contractual claims and claims in equity respectively. Part of the reason why we undertook 
to produce a series of books was that we believe there is merit in thinking about private 
law defences as a whole. 6  The workshop at which the papers published here were 
presented, and the book itself, confirms that that belief was, and remains, justified. The 
same questions that had arisen in our exploration of tort law defences frequently 
recurred in the unjust enrichment defences workshop. In this introductory chapter, we 
review several of these questions. We also set out how our contributors seek to answer 
them.  
                                                 
1  In our first collection, on tort law defences, we observed that defences are rarely discussed in the 
theoretical literature, citing J Oberdiek (ed), Philosophical Foundations of the Law of Torts (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2014) as an illustration. In a similar vein, there are no chapters on defences in R 
Chambers, C Mitchell, and J Penner (eds), Philosophical Foundations of the Law of Unjust Enrichment 
(Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2009). 
2  Eg, Ross Grantham and Charles Rickett write: ‘The integration of defences into the normative 
justification for liability is something that has been overlooked in most areas of the private law’: R 
Grantham and C Rickett, ‘A Normative Account of Defences to Restitutionary Liability’ (2008) 67 
Cambridge Law Journal 92, 103 n 57. Similarly, Graham Virgo observes: ‘In the field of private law, much 
work has been done to describe, explain and rationalise different causes of action. Whilst some 
excellent work has also been done as regards the analysis of specific defences, notably change of 
position and passing on as defences to claims in unjust enrichment, surprisingly little work has been 
done to analyse defences in private law more generally’: G Virgo, ‘Book Review’ (2015) 74 Cambridge 
Law Journal 160, 160. 
3  See, eg, HLA Hart, Punishment and Responsibility: Essays in the Philosophy of Law (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 1968) chs 2, 4 and 8; GP Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law (Boston, Little, Brown & 
Co, 1978) chs 7, 9–10; J Gardner, Offences and Defences: Essays in the Philosophy of Criminal Law (Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 2007) chs 4–9. 
4  Nevertheless, few theorists with expertise in both criminal law and private law have considered the 
possibility of cross-fertilisation. There are, of course, exceptions. The influence of Hart’s work on 
criminal law defences is visible in his seminal account of the concept of defeasibility, in which he 
considered defences in private law: HLA Hart, ‘The Ascription of Responsibility and Rights’ (1949) 49 
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 171.  
5  A Dyson, J Goudkamp and F Wilmot-Smith (eds), Defences in Tort (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2015).  
6  For more details regarding the project generally, see A Dyson, J Goudkamp and F Wilmot-Smith, 
‘Central Issues in the Law of Tort Defences’ in Dyson, Goudkamp and Wilmot-Smith (n 5) 3–5. 
II. Two Questions about Defences 
 
In this section we discuss two important controversies about defences. The first is what a 
defence actually is; the second is the justification for a legal system recognising defences. 
We discuss the first of these questions by reference to the distinction between denials 
and defences.  
 
A. Distinguishing Denials and Defences 
 
i. Preliminaries  
 
At the first workshop, on tort law defences, it was clear that there was no consensus as 
to the meaning of the term ‘defence’. Indeed, one of the essays in the subsequent 
collection concerned itself exclusively with the definition of the concept.7 It reveals that 
scholars understand the term in numerous different ways, and that disagreements 
between scholars in this regard are vigorous and multi-faceted, with several orthogonal 
debates breaking out. There seemed to be fewer disagreements at the unjust enrichment 
workshop on this particular point. However, this harmony may be illusory: when the 
question wapproached in terms of denials and defences (i.e., how are defences distinct 
from denials?), alliances seemed to be much shakier.  
In our chapter in the first book, on tort law defences, we considered the distinction 
between denials and defences at some length.8 The distinction aims to separate two kinds 
of response that a defendant might make to a claim: a denial is an assertion that the cause 
of action is incomplete;9 a defence accepts that the cause of action is complete, but 
argues that liability should be reduced or eliminated on account of some other 
consideration (although some scholars consider rules that merely reduce liability not to 
be defences but a tertium quid). 10  Difficult issues regarding this distinction that we 
identified included: whether there is indeed a conceptual distinction between denials and 
defences; and, if there is a distinction, the identification of the different characteristics of 
denials and defences.  
Several contributors endorse the distinction between denials and defences in this 
volume.11 For instance, Klimchuk says:12  
 
‘We can ask, first, whether change of position works to deny that an element of the 
cause of action in unjust enrichment has been made out, or whether instead it 
                                                 
7  L Duarte d’Almeida, ‘Defining “Defences”’ in Dyson, Goudkamp and Wilmot-Smith (n 5). 
8  Dyson, Goudkamp and Wilmot-Smith (n 6) 6–8. 
9  This is perhaps insufficiently nuanced. A defendant might raise a partial denial. For instance, a 
defendant might accept that she has been unjustly enriched at the claimant’s expense, but deny that she 
has been enriched to the extent of the objective measure. We observe that debate exists as to whether 
such a contention should be characterised as a partial denial (‘subjective devaluation’) or a defence 
(‘change of position’). See, in particular, Sempra Metals Ltd (formerly Metallgesellschaft Ltd) v Inland Revenue 
Commissioners [2007] UKHL 34; [2008] 1 AC 561, 606 [119] (Lord Nicholls); Benedetti v Saiwiris [2013] 
UKSC 50; [2014] AC 938, 987–88 [118] (Lord Reed JSC). 
10  See, eg, J Goudkamp, Tort Law Defences (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2013) 6. 
11  Mitchell p.3 (‘either as a denial that the claimant has…’); Scott p.1; Virgo p.8 (‘If a claimant seeks 
restitution’). Cf Häcker p. 000, footnote 7. 
12  Klimchuk, p.3. See, further, Meier’s definition of a defence as ‘a fact that is able to extinguish an 
otherwise given cause of action’. p 4-5. 
serves to reduce the defendant’s liability notwithstanding that the elements of the 
cause of action have been made out.’ 
 
However, although the distinction is evidently seen to be of vital import by contributors 
who recognise it—for example, both Helen Scott and Dennis Klimchuk dedicate 
substantial parts of their chapters to the proper classification of two doctrinal rules by 
reference to it—our contributors seem as a whole to assume the distinction is 
unproblematic. In our earlier work, we suggested some reasons to doubt whether the 
distinction is indeed trouble-free.13 We want to highlight three problems with which 
scholars who endorse the distinction must, in our view, grapple. First, we discuss some 
disagreement about the nature of the distinction between denials and defences; next, we 
ask whether the law of unjust enrichment recognises the distinction; and finally we 
consider whether the distinction is exhaustive of the rules that comprise the law of unjust 
enrichment.  
 
ii. What Kind of Distinction is it? 
 
There appeared to be some disagreement amongst our contributors about the nature of 
the distinction between denials and defences. In her contribution Elise Bant argues that 
understanding the defence of change of position ‘as an aspect of the general enrichment 
enquiry’ (i.e., as part of the cause of action) would be ‘contrary to the vast preponderance 
of authority that conceives of and treats the defence as having a role independent of the 
elements of the primary claim’.14 Although Bant is here concerned with the possible 
changes to the substantive rules of change of position which might have to be made if 
change of position were thought of as a denial, the passage suggests one way in which 
the distinction between denials and defences can be understood: as one that the law itself 
draws. On this analysis, in other words, the boundary of the distinction between denials 
and defences is to be settled by legal authorities.  
Compare Bant’s analysis with that offered by Helen Scott. Scott writes that ‘the 
distinction between actions and defences, and more specifically denials and defences, 
turns on substantive arguments about the definition of torts’.15 Although Scott is talking 
about the law of torts here, the context makes it clear that her claim in this regard is not 
confined to that branch of private law. Scott adds that the task of deciding whether some 
doctrine is ‘extrinsic to the claimant’s action’ is ‘an exercise informed by doctrinal and 
moral arguments specific to the unjust enrichment context, not instrumental arguments 
of relatively general application’.16 All this suggests that the classification of a doctrine as 
a defence or a denial is not a mere function of authority; instead, it depends in part on 
normative arguments extrinsic to the law (even if these arguments must, for whatever 
reason, be local ‘to the unjust enrichment context’). Scott does not, we take it, mean to 
suggest that the question is whether there are good normative reasons to employ the 
distinction—we are here concerned with definition, not justification. 17  Instead, she 
                                                 
13  Dyson, Goudkamp and Wilmot-Smith (n 6) 7. 
14  Bant, p.7. 
15  Scott, p.1. 
16  ibid p.2. 
17  We address the issue of justification in Section IIB.  
suggests that normative arguments cannot be avoided in the description of the 
distinction between denials and defences.18  
 
iii. Does the Law of Unjust Enrichment Recognise the Distinction? 
 
The next problem concerns whether the distinction between denials and defences, 
howsoever understood, is recognised in the law of unjust enrichment. It is salutary here 
to recall certain statements defining the cause of action in unjust enrichment. In a widely 
endorsed passage, Lightman J stated:19 
 
‘It is now authoritatively established that there are four essential ingredients to a 
claim in restitution: 
i)  a benefit must have been gained by the defendant; 
ii)  the benefit must have been obtained at the claimant’s expense; 
 iii)  it must be legally unjust, that is to say there must exist a factor (referred to 
as an unjust factor) rendering it unjust, for the defendant to retain the 
benefit; 
 iv) there must be no defence available to extinguish or reduce the defendant’s 
liability to make restitution.’ 
 
Taken literally, this would show that the law of unjust enrichment does not distinguish 
denials and defences. The fourth ingredient that Lightman J mentions brings defences 
within his definition of an action in unjust enrichment in negative form.20 The absence of 
defences is, in other words, one of the elements of the action.21  
Attempts to fold defences into the cause of action have been made not only in 
relation to definitions of a cause of action in unjust enrichment but also in connection 
with individual ‘defences’. Consider, for example, the fact that one prominent way of 
understanding the change of position ‘defence’ is to see it as concerned with 
‘disenrichment’ and hence with the enrichment element of the action. Peter Birks argued 
that this ‘defence’ ‘[attacks the element of] “enrichment at the expense of the 
claimant.”’ 22  So conceived, the change of position ‘defence’ is not, it would seem, 
‘external’ to the cause of action. Given the prominence of the change of position 
‘defence’, this logic might lead one to think that the law of unjust enrichment does not 
recognise any defences. Perhaps some legal systems have reached that position already. 
                                                 
18  There are interesting parallels here with well-known debates in general jurisprudence concerning the 
nature of conceptual analysis. See, eg, HLA Hart, The Concept of Law, 2nd edn (Oxford, Clarendon 
Press, 1994) 244; JM Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1980) ch 
1. Cf Dworkin’s claim that ‘the flat distinction between distinction and evaluation’ has ‘enfeebled legal 
theory’: R Dworkin, A Matter of Principle (Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press, 1985) 148. 
19  R (Rowe) v Vale of White Horse DC [2003] EWHC 388 (Admin); [2003] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 418, 421 [11]. 
20  Cf the more circumspect remarks of Lord Clarke JSC in Benedetti v Sawiris [2013] UKSC 50; [2014] AC 
938, 955 [10]: ‘a court must first ask itself four questions’.  
21  For a thorough theoretical consideration (and rejection) of the thesis that there is no distinction 
between defences and denials see L Duarte d’Almeida, Allowing for Exceptions: A Theory of Defences and 
Defeasibility in Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2015). 
22  P Birks, Unjust Enrichment, 2nd edn (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005) 208. Birks’s commitment 
to this view is unclear. Elsewhere he made remarks that are inconsistent with viewing the change of 
position doctrine as striking at the enrichment element of an action in unjust enrichment. See ibid 207, 
where Birks spoke of defences as ‘trumping the injustice of the defendant’s enrichment’. For 
elaboration of Birks’ position in this regard, see J Goudkamp and C Mitchell, ‘Denials and Defences in 
the Law of Unjust Enrichment’ in C Mitchell and W Swadling (eds), The Restatement Third: Restitution and 
Unjust Enrichment (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2013) 144. 
For instance, Helen Scott, in her contribution in this volume, suggests that ‘South 
African law may embody that mythical system … in which all liability rules have been 
assimilated into the elements of the action, rendering defences (or at least defences 
specific to the law of enrichment) superfluous’.23 
These remarks raise many important questions. Is the law of unjust enrichment best 
understood without considering defences? Or is there some reason why the concept of 
defences—howsoever understood—is important to our understanding of the terrain? 
More generally, should such an approach—whereby defences are folded into the cause of 
action—be applied to the legal system as a whole? Or is there something wrong with 
such a system? We will return to this last question later, when we consider the point of 
formulating legal rules as defences.24 For now, however, we want to highlight another 
reason to examine the law of unjust enrichment through the prism of this distinction, 
between defences and denials: it casts light on a well-known debate concerning the basis 
of the law of unjust enrichment. Unjust enrichment lawyers customarily distinguish 
‘unjust factors’ systems from ‘absence of basis’ systems.25 Under the former system, a 
claimant’s success depends upon her showing that an enrichment was transferred under 
the influence of an ‘unjust factor’, such as a mistake. In the latter, a claimant’s success 
depends upon her demonstrating that the enrichment was transferred without legal basis. 
These systems may view particular doctrines, in terms of the divide between denials and 
defences, differently. Consider, for example, the well-recognised rule that ‘to the extent 
that a payment made under a mistake discharges a contractual debt of the payee, it 
cannot be recovered’.26 Lawyers who endorse the ‘unjust factors’ approach sometimes 
interpret this ‘enrichment owed’ doctrine as a defence.27 This seems to have been how 
Robert Goff J understood the doctrine. In Barclays Bank Ltd v WJ Simms his Lordship 
wrote:28 
 
‘If a person pays money to another under a mistake of fact which causes him to 
make the payment, he is prima facie entitled to recover it as money paid under a 
mistake of fact … His claim may however fail if … the payment is made for good 
consideration, in particular if the money is paid to discharge, and does discharge, a 
debt owed to the payee (or a principal on whose behalf he is authorised to receive 
the payment) by the payer or by a third party by whom he is authorised to 
discharge the debt.’ 
 
                                                 
23  Scott, p.10. 
24  See Section IIB(ii). 
25  The literature on these different approaches is voluminous. See, eg, A Burrows ‘Absence of Basis: The 
New Birksian Scheme’ in A Burrows and A Rodger (eds), Mapping the Law: Essays in Memory of Peter 
Birks (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2006) 33; S Meier, ‘No Basis: A Comparative View’ in A Burrows and 
Lord Rodger (eds), Mapping the Law: Essays in Memory of Peter Birks (Oxford 2006) 343; R Stevens ‘Is 
there a Law of Unjust Enrichment?’ in J Edelman and S Degeling (eds), Unjust Enrichment in Commercial 
Law (Sydney, Law Book Co, 2008) 11. 
26  Fairfield Sentry Ltd v Migani [2014] UKPC 9; [2014] 1 CLC 611, 619 [18] (Lord Sumption JSC). In his 
contribution to the present volume, Andrew Kull examines restitution between successive fraud 
victims, which gives rise to similar issues. 
27  C Mitchell, P Mitchell and S Watterson, Goff & Jones: The Law of Unjust Enrichment, 8th edn (London, 
Sweet & Maxwell, 2011) ch 29.  
28   Barclays Bank Ltd v WJ Simms [1980] QB 677 (QBD) 695. 
If one endorses the view that any payment ‘under a mistake of fact’, regardless of whether it 
discharges a liability, is prima facie sufficient for restitution, enrichment owed—or the 
‘good consideration’ doctrine—naturally falls to be considered at a later stage.  
By way of contrast in her chapter in the present volume, Helen Scott suggests that 
under an absence of basis system:29 
 
‘The claimant cannot make out even a prima facie case without pleading the 
absence of liability … and, at least in cases involving an apparent contractual or 
other obligation, without proving the non-existence or invalidity of that 
obligation.’ 
 
In this way, the proper classification of the enrichment owed doctrine feeds into one of 
the most heated questions in the academic debate on the law of unjust enrichment. 
Indeed, the proper classification of the doctrine may turn on the following question: 
does the fact the enrichment was owed defeat a prima facie injustice, as the unjust factors 
view might hold? 30 Or does it, instead, demonstrate that there was no injustice at all, as 
the absence of legal ground view might hold? We hope that this shows that examining 
the distinction between denials and defences, and seeing whether it is instantiated in the 
law of unjust enrichment, is vitally important if we are to understand the law as a whole. 
 
iv. Is the Distinction Exhaustive? 
 
The final question that we will discuss regarding the distinction between denials and 
defences is whether it is exhaustive (that is, does it encompass every plea a defendant 
might make to resist a claim in unjust enrichment?). One might conclude that there are 
doctrines in the law of unjust enrichment that cannot properly be categorised as 
pertaining to either the denials or defences categories. The doctrine of illegality is 
arguably such a rule.31 Although many—including Graham Virgo, in his contribution to 
this volume32—regard the doctrine of illegality as a defence, consider Lord Sumption 
JSC’s claim that33 
 
‘although described as a defence, it is in reality a rule of judicial abstention. It 
means that rather than regulating the consequences of an illegal act (for example by 
restoring the parties to the status quo ante, in the same way as on the rescission of 
                                                 
29  Scott, p.11. 
30  Cf, however, A Burrows, ‘Good consideration in the law of unjust enrichment’ (2013) 129 Law 
Quarterly Review 329, 331: ‘The importance of a mistaken payment being made for good consideration is 
not that this constitutes a defence but that this means that the payment is being made under a contract 
so that, unless the contract is invalid, there is no prima facie right to restitution’. If this is correct, the 
distinction between the supposedly rival systems arguably becomes very difficult to make out. 
31  We do not here consider the possibility of illegality as a cause of action in unjust enrichment. For 
discussion, see W Swadling, ‘The Role of Illegality in the English Law of Unjust Enrichment’ in D 
Johnston and R Zimmerman (eds), Unjustified Enrichment: Key Issues in Comparative Perspective (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 2002). 
32  Virgo, p.9: ‘If a claimant seeks restitution for unjust enrichment, the fact that the claim is tainted by 
illegality will operate as a defence’. 
33  Les Laboratoires Servier v Apotex Inc [2014] UKSC 55; [2015] AC 430, 445 [23]. Cf Jetivia SA v Bilta (UK) 
Limited (in liquidation) [2015] UKSC 23; [2015] 2 WLR 1168 where Lord Sumption at 1187 [60] calls 
judicial abstention the ‘policy’ (rather than the rule?) and, at 1187 [55], where he says: ‘It is convenient 
to call this the illegality defence, although the label is not entirely accurate for it also applies to a very 
limited category of acts which are immoral without being illegal.’ 
a contract) the courts withhold judicial remedies, leaving the loss to lie where it 
falls.’ 
 
This passage suggests that Lord Sumption would not regard the distinction between 
denials and defences as being exhaustive. His Lordship explicitly states that illegality is 
not a defence, but neither does he appear to understand it as a denial. In similar fashion, 
Ross Grantham and Charles Rickett argue that:34 
 
‘The need to incorporate the defences into the overall normative justification of 
unjust enrichment does not, of course, rule out the existence of defences that 
reflect policy considerations external to the law of unjust enrichment or even the 
private law as a whole. As is the case with contractual and tortious liabilities, issues 
such as illegality and excessive delay in bringing proceedings offer reasons to deny 
liability, but these factors are not central to the logic or extent of liability.’ 
 
If there are indeed such doctrines, how should they be classified? Is illegality the sole 
example, or are there other similar doctrines, as Grantham and Rickett seem to suggest?  
 
v. Conclusion 
 
Attempts to distinguish denials from defences are regarded by some as arid 
conceptualism. We hope that we have shown this not to be the case. There are important 
theoretical questions at the heart of the distinction, and a proper understanding of the 
distinction and its application in the law is vital to questions as basic as the foundation of 
the law of unjust enrichment. Our remarks have perhaps raised more questions than they 
have answered, but this only goes to show the amount of work that remains to be done 
in this field.  
 
B.  The Rationale of Defences  
 
There may, of course, be numerous reasons why a legal system might employ defences.35 
In this subsection we will examine the rationale of defences from two angles. First, we 
will consider two reasons why the law of unjust enrichment might limit the 
circumstances in which claimants can recover and note that the difference between these 
reasons may have practical consequences. In this discussion, we want to remain agnostic 
as to whether recovery is limited by way of a defence or by modification of the elements 
of the cause of action. Accordingly, we will refer to such control devices as ‘exceptions’. 
Secondly, we will ask whether the law should formulate exceptions as defences (rather than 
through more precise definition of the cause of action).  
 
i. Two Reasons for Recognising Exceptions 
 
In his contribution to this volume, Graham Virgo writes that:36 
 
‘Most of the defences to claims in unjust enrichment focus on the relationship 
between the claimant and the defendant, and are normatively related to the 
principle of corrective justice. That is not the case with the defence of illegality, 
                                                 
34  Grantham and Rickett (n 2) 94. 
35  For a list of possible rationales, see Goudkamp and Mitchell (n 22) 146–50. 
36  Virgo, p.1 (footnotes omitted). 
which is influenced by external considerations of public policy rather than securing 
justice between the parties.’ 
 
Many judges and scholars would accept Virgo’s claim that the illegality doctrine is 
unconcerned with justice between the parties.37 For example, Lord Mansfield said in 
Holman v Johnson that the doctrine ‘is founded in general principles of policy, which the 
defendant has the advantage of, contrary to the real justice, as between him and the 
plaintiff’. 38  Lord Sumption JSC endorsed Lord Mansfield’s understanding in Les 
Laboratoires Servier v Apotex Inc. His Lordship remarked that the illegality doctrine ‘is in the 
nature of things bound to confer capricious benefits on defendants some of whom have 
little to be said for them in the way of merits, legal or otherwise’.39 We have already 
noted40 Lord Sumption’s view that the illegality doctrine is ‘in reality a rule of judicial 
abstention’.41 This view is related to the proposition that the doctrine is unconcerned 
with realising inter-personal justice. The justification for the illegality doctrine is instead, 
for Lord Sumption, a ‘principle of consistency’.42 When achieving inter-personal justice 
would undermine the consistency (or ‘integrity’, in the language of McLachlin J in Hall v 
Hebert43) of the legal system, the interest in consistency is prioritised. Consistency is 
achieved by judicial abstention. 
 It is not our purpose to engage with the merits of these rival accounts of the doctrine 
of illegality. Instead, we want to draw attention to the fact that the passages in the 
previous paragraph suggest that there are at least two general reasons why a legal system 
might recognise an exception to a liability rule: first, in order to take account of the 
concerns of justice between the parties; second, to uphold the integrity of the legal 
process itself. We believe that these reasons may have consequences for the rules of 
pleading. Virgo claims that the doctrine of illegality’s ‘public policy foundations’ explains 
why ‘illegality may defeat a claim even though it has not been pleaded’.44 This implies that 
rules concerned with upholding the integrity of the legal system can be considered by the 
court on the court’s own motion.  
 Another potential consequence of the distinction between inter-party justice 
exceptions and integrity-based exceptions relates to the breadth of application of the 
exception in question. As Lionel Smith observes in his essay in this collection, ‘[s]ome 
                                                 
37  Cf, in this respect, Chief Justice McLachlin’s contribution to the previous collection on tort law 
defences, in which she argued that the doctrine of illegality is founded on corrective justice: B 
McLachlin, ‘Weaving the Law’s Seamless Web: Reflections on the Illegality Defence in Tort Law’ in 
Dyson, Goudkamp and Wilmot-Smith (n 5). This claim arguably commits her to the proposition that 
the doctrine of illegality is concerned with inter-personal justice rather than with broader societal 
concerns.  
38  Holman v Johnson (1775) 1 Cowp 341, 343; 98 ER 1120, 1121. 
39  Above n 33, 440 [13]. Cf his Lordship’s remark that ‘the defence [ought not to be extended] far more 
widely than anything warranted by the demands of justice’: Jetivia SA v Bilta (UK) Ltd (in liquidation) 
(n 33) 1192 [70]. It is unclear whether ‘justice’ here refers to inter-personal justice or to some other 
concept.  
40  See the text accompanying n 43 above.  
41  Above n 33, 445 [23].  
42  Above n 33, 446 [24]. 
43  Hall v Hebert [1993] 2 SCR 159 (SCC) 176. 
44  Virgo, p.16. Virgo is correct that illegality can be raised by the court proprio motu: Law Commission, The 
Illegality Defence: A Consultative Report (Law Com Consultation Paper 189, 2009) 133 [7.22]; Ferguson v John 
Dawson & Partners (Contractors) Ltd [1976] 1 WLR 1213 (CA) 1218. 
defences are available to more than one cause of action. Illegality is an example’.45 In 
Vellino v Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Sedley LJ said ‘[the illegality doctrine] applies 
across the board’.46 If the illegality doctrine seeks to uphold the integrity of the legal 
system, the doctrine’s application to numerous causes of action is unsurprising: such a 
doctrine should be available (if desired) whenever a cause of action is capable of 
undermining that integrity. Inter-personal defences do not appear to have such broad 
applicability. For example, the doctrine of contributory negligence is available to some 
actions in tort (such negligence) but not others (such as trespass47 and deceit48). Quite 
how important this apparent distinction is remains to be seen, but is certainly worthy of 
further inquiry. 
 
ii. Why use Defences? 
 
Would there be anything wrong with what Helen Scott terms the ‘mythical system … in 
which all liability rules have been assimilated into the elements of the action’?49 Some 
scholars seem to think that there would be. For instance, in her contribution Elise Bant 
considers the change of position defence and warns of ‘the danger—realised in some 
cases—that, by focussing on the extent to which a defendant’s assets remain swollen by 
her receipt the defence will come to be treated simply as an aspect of the general 
enrichment enquiry’.50 Bant here assumes that there would be something wrong with a 
system which assimilated change of position to an aspect of the cause of action. 
However, what, exactly, would be wrong with such a system?51 Why should not a legal 
system fold exceptions into the elements of the action in order to create Scott’s 
postulated ‘mythical system’? In other words, why should the law seek to respond to the 
reasons for exceptions to rules by way of defences?  
 To understand an interesting—but, we think, ultimately flawed—answer to this 
question, notice that the cause of action in unjust enrichment is very expansive. In most 
cases, it is complete on receipt of the enrichment—for instance, when money is paid to 
the defendant by mistake.52 The upshot of this is that the cause of action in unjust 
enrichment imposes not only strict liability (that is to say, liability that arises irrespective 
of whether the defendant was at fault) but also what might be called ‘passive liability’.53 
By passive liability we mean liability that arises irrespective of the defendant’s 
                                                 
45  L Smith p.27.  
46  Vellino v Chief Constable of Greater Manchester [2001] EWCA Civ 1249; [2002] 1 WLR 218, 228 [44]. ‘We 
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48  Standard Chartered Bank v Pakistan National Shipping Corp (Nos 2 and 4) [2002] UKHL 43; [2003] 1 AC 959. 
49  Scott, p.10. 
50  Bant, p.6-7. 
51  Bant’s reason is that it would restrict the ambit of change of position to situations where the defendant 
is ‘disenriched’, ie, loses what the law would class as an enrichment at the cause of action stage: see text 
to n 14. We are unconvinced by this; the law could recognise a doctrine with the same ambit at the cause 
of action stage.  
52  Cf subsequent failures of consideration: Guardian Ocean Cargoes Ltd v Banco do Brasil [1994] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 
152 (CA). 
53  S Smith, ‘A Duty to Make Restitution’ (2013) 26 Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 157, 170: ‘the 
subject of the duty may be entirely innocent, even passive’. 
participation in, or perhaps even irrespective of the defendant’s awareness of, the facts 
on which the claim is based.54 This ‘unilaterality’, i.e., the creation of ‘a right against 
someone who had no hand in bringing about the matter she now bears a responsibility to 
set aright’, gives rise to a puzzle: how can such a rule be justified?55  
 It has been argued that defences can justify an expansive cause of action. For example, 
in Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale Ltd Lord Goff of Chieveley opined that56 
 
‘the recognition of change of position as a defence should be … beneficial 
[because it] … will enable a more generous approach to be taken to the recognition 
of the right to restitution, in the knowledge that the defence is, in more 
appropriate cases, available.’ 
 
Several contributors to this volume endorse the view, as Dennis Klimchuk puts it, that 
‘restitution for unjust enrichment should never make defendants worse off’.57 Meeting 
that promise is widely understood to be the purpose of the change of position defence. 
There is some debate in the essays about whether the appropriate baseline for being 
‘worse off’ is historical, as Bant argues, 58  or counterfactual, as Ratan argues. 59  An 
historical baseline seeks to ensure that the defendant is not worse off than the position 
she was in before the defective transfer; a counterfactual baseline seeks to ensure that the 
defendant is not worse off than the position she would have been in some specified possible 
world.60 But prior to this debate, these commentators all appear to agree with the claim 
that the existence of the change of position defence helps to justify the cause of action in 
unjust enrichment.61  
 This argument is difficult to assess as it has never been developed in detail. It may 
state no more than a conditional: if you have defences, they can justify causes of action. 
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be bound up with the question of what problem the cause of action in unjust enrichment seeks to 
remedy. He claims that to discover the appropriate counterfactual for the change of position defence, 
we would ideally  
delve into the normative theory of unjust enrichment. The pertinent question would be: 
which counterfactual baseline figures in the most compelling moral justification for the 
imposition of unjust enrichment liability? The baseline adopted in that fundamental debate 
could then be doctrinally implemented by the change of position defence. 
 Ratan, p.24. 
However, in relation to change of position Lord Goff does appear to commit to more 
than a conditional; his Lordship implies that the defence will allow the law to vindicate 
some good that it could not realise through manipulation of the cause of action alone. 
How can this be so? Why could the law not, for instance, develop causes of action which 
are capable of justification without the need for defences—or which distinguish between 
‘appropriate cases’ at the cause-of-action stage? One thought, which has occurred to a 
number of scholars, is that defences may help to finesse legal rules in a manner which 
cannot be done by modifying the content of the cause of action, or which can be done 
only with great impracticality. For instance, Peter Birks opined:62 
 
‘It has become apparent in recent years that the fine tuning of the law of unjust 
enrichment will fall to the [defences stage]. Restrictive interpretations of the cause 
of action have been relaxed as defences have begun to take the strain … [T]he new 
strategy will do more sensitive justice.’ 
 
Andrew Burrows appears to be attracted to this idea. He writes that ‘[r]ather than the 
courts placing arbitrary restrictions on liability, the scope of restitution is now more 
satisfactorily and openly controlled by the defences’.63 Burrows’s suggestion appears to 
be that attempting to control the circumstances in which liability arises at the cause-of-
action stage would be less ‘satisfactory’. However, what reason is there to accept that this 
is the case? In Birks’ terms, why does recognising defences permit the law of unjust 
enrichment ‘to ‘do more sensitive justice’? In Burrows’s language, why does the law of 
unjust enrichment dispose of cases ‘more satisfactorily and openly’ than it would if there 
were no defences and all relevant issues were treated as asking whether a cause of action 
exists?  
Perhaps the idea is that it would be too cumbersome to define a cause of action with 
sufficient specificity to account for all exceptions. In his chapter in this collection, Lionel 
Smith highlights Joseph Raz’s analysis on the individuation of norms.64 Raz writes that 
‘[i]t is possible to devise principles of individuation which guarantee that every rule 
includes all its qualifications and that no rules ever conflict with each other’. 65  For 
example:66 
 
‘The criminal law includes a rule prohibiting assault. This rule is qualified by 
various other laws. Assault is permitted in self-defense, in carrying out lawful 
orders, in cases of necessity … One might wish to claim … that no statement of 
the law against assault is a complete description of that law unless it enumerates all 
these qualifications. One may claim that the qualifying laws are not separate laws 
but only parts of the law prohibiting assault.’ 
 
However, Raz asserts, ‘[t]o do so would be to accept a very misguided doctrine of the 
individuation of laws’. 67  The laws we would have, on such a system, would be 
‘enormously complex. They [would] also be very repetitive, having much of their content 
in common (the doctrine of self-defense, for example, will be a part of each of the 
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criminal laws)’.68 Instead, therefore, ‘we should adopt a doctrine of individuation which 
keeps laws to a manageable size, avoids repetition, minimizes the need to refer to a great 
variety of statutes and cases as the sources of a single law…’.69  
Smith suggests that these passages ‘may also go a long way in helping us to 
understand why some elements should be classified as defences, rather than as parts of a 
cause of action’.70 He does not develop this idea. There are perhaps two distinct reasons 
to reduce complexity in the legal system. First, a pragmatic reason: less complexity makes 
the legal system easier for officials to manage. Second, a rule of law reason: by reducing 
complexity in this way, the law may be more intelligible and accessible. Both of these 
reasons may have intriguing implications for defences as a whole: they suggest that, 
where possible, the law should favour general defences, applicable to multiple causes of 
action, rather than a plethora of specific defences.  
A related argument in support of recognising defences, which is particularly relevant 
to the law of unjust enrichment, concerns burdens of proof.71 It might be contended that 
defences allow the law to allocate burdens efficiently and/or fairly. 72  For example, 
imagine a system which required claimants to prove the surviving enrichment in an 
unjustly enriched defendant’s hands in order to recover. The defendant is likely to have 
all of the evidence relevant to the claim (certainly, it is plausible to think that defendants 
will be much more likely to have access to the relevant evidence than claimants); if a 
claimant were required to prove the ultimate enrichment in the defendant’s hands, she 
would have to make invasive and possibly wasteful inquiries into the defendant’s 
actions. 73  These considerations perhaps explain why most legal systems require the 
defendant to produce evidence of expenditure. We doubt whether this point about 
access to evidence is a compelling reason for recognising defences. Instead of a change 
of position defence, could the law not, in a system which incorporated all defences as 
negative elements of the cause of action, avoid the difficulty involved in requiring the 
claimant to make invasive/wasteful inquiries into the defendant’s actions by putting the 
defendant to proof in respect of the enrichment element of the cause of action?  
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III. Themes Across Private Law 
  
A. The Unity of a Defence 
 
John Gardner has argued that self-defence to criminal liability might be both justificatory 
and excusatory. For Gardner, a defendant is justified in acting in self-defence if the 
defendant had an undefeated reason to exercise defensive force and the defendant acted 
for that reason. By contrast, in Gardner’s view, a defendant is excused in exercising 
defensive force where she mistakenly believed that there was an undefeated reason to use 
defensive force.74 Since (at least in England) the defence of self-defence is granted both 
to defendants who were justified and to defendants who were excused, in Gardner’s 
terms,75 Gardner is committed, we believe, to the proposition that there are justificatory 
and excusatory versions of the defence of self-defence.76 In a similar vein, Paul Robinson 
suggests that in some jurisdictions in the United States there may be two separate 
criminal law defences conflated under the heading of self-defence, one justificatory and 
the other excusatory.77 Within the law of unjust enrichment, illegality can operate as a 
defence and to disable a defence. In the first context, a claimant might be barred from 
raising the fact of an illegal agreement, and so may not be able to make good her claim 
(for example, for a failure of condition);78 in the second context, a defendant’s putative 
change of position defence can be barred if the act relied upon is itself illegal.79 One 
might, therefore, argue that there is more than one illegality defence within the law of 
unjust enrichment.80  
In his chapter in the present volume, Ajay Ratan resists a possible splintering of the 
change of position defence, arguing that the doctrine encompasses both pre- and post-
receipt detriment.81 Conversely, Dennis Klimchuk suggests that a unitary defence cannot 
be found. He considers change of position in the context of both reliance and non-
reliance based expenditures, and concludes that the doctrine ‘collects two defences’.82 
Klimchuk’s reason for saying there are two defences is that he believes one to be a denial 
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81  XREF. 
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(of enrichment) and the other ‘is akin to but not quite a denial’. 83  This account is 
different again from Elise Bant’s contribution, which holds there to be common ground 
between reliance and non-reliance based cases.84 
The assumption that change of position is unitary may also underpin part of Lionel 
Smith’s analysis. Smith asks: ‘is unjust enrichment a single cause of action, or a principle 
that unifies many causes of action?’ Relevantly for present purposes, he considers 
whether thinking about defences can assist in answering that question. He argues that the 
fact the defence of change of position is unavailable to certain claims, such as Woolwich 
claims for restitution of unlawfully levied taxes,85 ‘strongly suggest[s] that the claim being 
made is, in an important way, a different claim from the claims which are susceptible to the 
defence’.86 He reasons that ‘If [two claims] were based on the same cause of action—in 
the sense of the same normative justification—then surely the defence, whatever it is, 
would be potentially available in both situations’.87 Our only point is that this argument 
depends upon a proper individuation of the defence, such that it can be said that the 
same defence applies to different situations. Debates about the unity of causes of action 
are well known, as Smith describes in his chapter. Analogous questions arise at the 
defence stage: how unified must a doctrine be in order for it to count as a defence, rather 
than one among many?  
How should scholars approach this question? In his chapter, Smith attempts to 
explain in virtue of what one cause of action is distinct from another. He claims that:  
 
‘The correct level of generality for the definition of causes of action is one that 
neither lumps together juridically distinct justifications for legal recourses, nor 
pointlessly distinguishes between different ways in which the same justification 
may be activated’. 88 
 
This is undoubtedly question begging—it depends, for example, upon our being able to 
identify which justifications are ‘juridically distinct’—but it is a start. Can it, however, 
serve as a template for thinking about defences? Do the same concerns that affect the 
unity of causes of action affect the unity of defences? These questions are not tackled in 
this volume—but they are undoubtedly important for future work in this field.  
 Why, specifically, are they important? Beyond their theoretical interest, they can have 
practical implications. For example, a perennial question in the law of unjust enrichment 
concerns the interrelation between estoppel and change of position,89 and a number of 
lawyers—both scholars and judges—have tried to assimilate one doctrine into the other. 
Andrew Burrows has argued that ‘the injustice that estoppel is concerned to prevent is 
entirely, and more appropriately, achieved by another defence, namely change of 
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position’.90 The recognition of change of position, it follows, swallows up estoppel as a 
defence to claims in unjust enrichment. In Australian Financial Services and Leasing Pty Ltd v 
Hills Industries Ltd, Gageler J took the opposite view.91 His Honour said that ‘[t]here is 
much to be said for treating the defence of change of position … as a particular 
application of [estoppel] doctrine’.92 Burrows’s argument depends upon an evaluation of 
the normative foundations of the two doctrines, and concludes that the purpose of the 
estoppel defence is achieved more sensitively by change of position; Gageler J’s 
argument depends upon an ability to individuate defences (such that one defence can be 
said to be a class of another defence). These arguments, therefore, turn on prior question 
about how to identify the purposes of defences and how to distinguish defences on this 
basis.  
 
B. Defences and Commensurability 
 
Two things are commensurable if they can be measured by a common metric; they are 
incommensurable if they cannot.93 Commensurability—or, rather, incommensurability—
is important to several questions in the law of unjust enrichment (and, indeed, private 
law generally) and is hence a topic that deserves further attention.94 Peter Birks argued 
that ‘[a]ll the defences [to claims in unjust enrichment] work by trumping the injustice of 
the defendant’s enrichment’.95 Birks’s explanation of how defences operate seems here to 
invoke competing claims of justice, which are surely commensurable. Contrast this with 
Birks’s claim that the change of position defence exists in order to96 
 
‘reconcile the interest in obtaining restitution of unjust enrichment with the 
competing interest in the security of receipts. There is a general interest in our 
being free to dispose of wealth which appears to be at our disposition. The defence 
avoids the need to sterilize funds against the danger of unsuspected unjust 
enrichment claims.’ 
 
From this passage, it is clear that Birks did not see the interests in play regarding change 
of position as having a common currency; the interest in security of receipts is not one of 
justice. (Some scholars claim that even this position can be overridden by yet further 
concerns.97)  
 These comments raise several important questions. One such question is whether it is 
logically possible for incommensurable considerations to be weighed. Another is whether 
concerns regarding incommensurability are more acute depending on where in the law of 
unjust enrichment they arise. In her contribution, Helen Scott seems to suggest that we 
should be less worried about incommensurability when it arises in connection with 
defences than where the incommensurable factors are confined to the cause of action 
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stage. She rejects Andrew Burrows’s claim that the good consideration doctrine overrides 
the injustice at the cause of action stage.98 Scott argues: ‘In order for the defendant’s 
entitlement to the benefit to ‘override’ or ‘outweigh’ the claimant’s mistake, these two 
considerations would have to be commensurable’. 99 From these remarks we might derive 
the following claim: the law cannot meaningfully weigh up two incommensurable goods 
when those goods are found within the cause of action stage. However, she does not 
doubt that the good consideration doctrine ‘overrides’ in this fashion and accepts it is 
rational for it to form part of the law. Her objection is to placing it within the cause of 
action stage. She suggests that it must instead come at a later stage. It follows that Scott 
does not appear to think that the incommensurability objection applies equally at the 
defences stage. We doubt that this is so, though the point deserves more attention. 
Other scholars and judges appear to agree that the law can balance incommensurable 
goods at the defence stage. Within unjust enrichment, Elise Bant has argued that having 
a child can count as a relevant change of position, notwithstanding the fact it cannot (she 
says) be understood in terms commensurable with the concept of enrichment.100 Beyond 
the law of unjust enrichment, consider a case where a court reduces a claimant’s damages 
due to her contributory negligence. Lord Reed JSC has argued that ‘[t]he court is not 
comparing like with like’. 101 His Lordship explains: the defendant ‘has acted in breach of 
a duty (not necessarily a duty of care) which was owed to the pursuer; the pursuer, on the 
other hand, has acted with a want of regard for her own interests’.102 On this analysis, it 
follows that ‘the blameworthiness of the pursuer and the [defendant] are 
incommensurable’. 103  Notice, however, that Lord Reed does not conclude that the 
apportionment exercise is impossible;104 instead, it leads his Lordship to the view that 
appellate courts would rarely interfere with a finding concerning apportionment as ‘a 
variety of possible answers can legitimately be given’.105  
This disagreement casts light on a prominent debate within the law of illegality. On 
one view, the law should aim to balance a number of competing policies—the need to 
deter, to do inter-party justice, to ensure that the integrity of the law is upheld, etc.—in a 
fact specific inquiry. For example, in Parkingeye Ltd v Somerfield Stores Ltd Toulson LJ said: 
‘in the area of illegality, experience has shown that it is better to recognise that there may 
be conflicting considerations and that the rules need to be developed and applied in a 
way which enables the court to balance them fairly’.106 One objection that might be raised 
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against balancing a range of factors is that it yields unpredictable outcomes. For instance, 
in Apotex Lord Sumption JSC said that the Court of Appeal’s approach ‘was a process, 
discretionary in all but name, whose outcome would have been exceptionally difficult for 
either party’s advisers to predict in advance’.107 Is this a problem? One participant at the 
workshop suggested that, insofar as the illegality defence was designed in part to deter 
wrongdoing, less certainty about its application could be a virtue, not a vice!108 
Perhaps a more powerful objection is that a balancing approach is conceptually 
confused, like asking a judge to ‘gauge whether three metres or 16 gallons is greater’.109 In 
Saunders v Edwards Bingham LJ seemed to suggest that it was relevant, in applying the 
doctrine of illegality, to consider the unlawfulness of the claimant’s act on the one hand 
and the quantum of the claimant’s loss on the other.110 The apparent purpose of this 
examination was to ensure that the denial of a claim for illegality did not result in the 
infliction of punishment on the claimant that was out of all proportion to the gravity of 
his wrongdoing. But if these two factors – unlawfulness and the magnitude of the loss 
that would be left uncompensated if the defence of illegality applied—are 
incommensurable, does it make sense to ask the court to reach a ‘proportionate’ 
conclusion about how they are to be balanced? 111  It was perhaps this concern that 
prompted Graham Virgo to suggest that there is a ‘danger that [an approach that requires 
the court to weigh a host of policy considerations] collapses from a principled exercise of 
judicial discretion into the exercise of arbitrary choice, potentially even returning to the 
old public conscience test’112 espoused in Tinsley v Milligan.113 Whether this is indeed a 
problem depends upon what constitutes a ‘principled exercise of judicial discretion’. 
Virgo does not define that concept. The question is: can a discretion be exercised in a 
principled fashion when the goods in question are incommensurable? Virgo seems to 
think so. He advocates a ‘middle way’ between the two approaches canvassed. We 
should, he claims, recognise114  
 
‘the public policy dimension of the illegality defence as a starting point for its 
application, but then moderate… this by reference both to how illegality is defined 
and to various recognised mechanisms which can be analysed as involving both 
countervailing policy considerations and the need to consider the justice of the 
case as between the parties. This involves the exercise of judicial discretion in a 
principled way.’ 
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This approach is only possible, it should be clear, if incommensurable goods can be 
balanced: it involves more factors, not fewer. We have not the space to reach a 
considered view on these various claims. Our concern here has been to highlight the 
issue, and we hope that private law scholars will in the future consider the topic in 
greater detail. 
 
C. The Merits of a Comparative Perspective 
 
Several contributions in this volume make use of comparative law. For instance, Sonja 
Meier examines bona fide purchase in the context of both English and German law; 
Helen Scott considers the distinction between unjust factor and absence of basis systems 
through the lens of ‘enrichment owed’; and Lionel Smith surveys not only a number of 
common law jurisdictions, but also a civilian perspective on his question.115 Even those 
contributors who do not adopt an overtly comparative analysis do analyse the law from 
numerous jurisdictions. Birke Häcker looks at German and United States law on 
minority as well as England and Wales; Elise Bant considers authorities from Australia 
and England and Wales on change of position; and Andrew Kull examines both US and 
English and Welsh authorities.  
This approach has found favour in many common law courts. Judges often cite 
comparative material.116 Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury PSC recently said:117  
 
‘As overseas countries secede from the jurisdiction of the Privy Council, it is 
inevitable that inconsistencies in the common law will develop between different 
jurisdictions. However, it seems to us highly desirable for all those jurisdictions to 
learn from each other, and at least to lean in favour of harmonising the 
development of the common law round the world’. 
 
Comparative law has been vital to the development of the law of unjust enrichment, and 
its defences. In Kleinwort Benson v Lincoln CC, the House of Lords abolished the rule that 
mistakes of law would not ground a claim in unjust enrichment. Lord Goff said:118 
 
‘I have referred to the fact that the mistake of law rule has already been abrogated 
in other common law jurisdictions, either by legislation or by judicial decision. This 
material is, of course, well known to lawyers in this country, and has, I know, been 
studied by all members of the appellate committee, not of course for the first time, 
and is regarded with great respect.’ 
 
And in Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale Ltd, as part of his argument in favour of the recognition 
of the change of position defence, his Lordship said ‘The principle is widely recognised 
throughout the common law world … The time for its recognition in this country is, in 
my opinion, long overdue’.119 
 This harmony of academic and judicial approaches is striking for at least two reasons. 
First, academics rarely agree with each other, let alone with the judiciary, about the 
                                                 
115  L Smith, p9-15. 
116  For a recent survey of the use of foreign decisions by the House of Lords and Supreme Court see A 
Burrows, ‘The Influence of Comparative Law on the English Law of Obligations’ in A Robertson and 
M Tilbury (eds), The Common Law of Obligations: Divergence and Unity (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2015). 
117  FHR European Ventures LLP v Cedar Capital Partners LLC [2014] UKSC 45; [2015] AC 250. 
118  Kleinwort Benson v Lincoln City Council [1999] 2 AC 349 (HL) 373. 
119  Above n 56, 579.  
proper role of history, philosophy and economics in legal reasoning; why is there such 
agreement on the use of comparative material? Second, not everyone does agree with this 
use of comparative material. The most famous disagreements on this point have been on 
the United States Supreme Court in the context of constitutional interpretation.120 For 
instance, in Roper v Simmons Kennedy J’s plurality opinion referred to the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (a treaty the United States has not ratified).121 A 
number of Justices have argued that such citation is illicit. Thomas J has protested that: 
‘While Congress, as a legislature, may wish to consider the actions of other nations on any 
issue it likes, this Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence should not impose foreign 
moods, fads, or fashions on Americans’.122 On that basis, Scalia J has called the use of 
foreign law ‘dangerous’;123 indeed, ‘the basic premise of the [United States Supreme] 
Court’s argument – that American law should conform to the laws of the rest of the 
world – ought to be rejected out of hand’.124 The context of this debate is obviously quite 
far removed from the law of unjust enrichment, but we think that parallel issues arise.  
This harmony—and discord—prompts a number of questions. Our interest here is to 
raise perhaps the most obvious, but also the most important, question: what is the merit 
of a comparative analysis? At one point in his essay Lionel Smith points out that 
‘[n]either a claim in German law, nor a source of obligation in French or Quebec law, is 
defined entirely in terms of primary facts’.125 One might respond: so what? Why is it that 
this discovery is an important discovery? More specifically, why should a court ever look 
to foreign law in formulating its own rules? We will consider three possible justifications. 
 The first possible justification of a comparative approach is the notion that it is not 
really comparative; a ‘comparative approach’ in reality involves looking to a common set 
of rules. For example, in the context of constitutional jurisprudence, Jeremy Waldron has 
argued that courts can draw on supranational legal norms, a ius gentium.126 Closer to our 
topic, Lord Hailsham LC in Broome v Cassell & Co Ltd (No 1) (a case about the availability 
of exemplary damages in private law) said that he viewed ‘with dismay the doctrine that 
the common law should differ in different parts of the Commonwealth’.127 Why? One 
possible reason is that Lord Hailsham regarded divergence as a betrayal of the very 
nature of the common law—which was to unite the legal systems of numerous 
jurisdictions. A similar argument is put by Robert Stevens, who claims that: 128 
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‘Our common law [of torts] is the embodiment of our rights one against another. 
At the margin these rights are, as a matter of morality, underdetermined, and one 
of the justifications for private law is that it provides the determinacy which 
individual reflection cannot provide. At the margin some divergence between 
different systems is understandable and not a source of concern. However, it 
should be and is a source of grave concern if the judges of one common law 
system embark on radical change based upon a novel conception of what the law 
of torts is.’ 
 
 A second possible explanation is epistemic. The basic idea would be that foreign 
courts are a source of wisdom from which to draw. A caricature of this view would 
suppose that whatever rule is most widely endorsed has the prima facie case to being the 
best rule.129 According to this caricature, the determination of the rule that should be 
adopted in any given context should be decided according to a popularity contest. 
Stevens endorses a moderate version of this thesis when he says:130 
 
‘Being inconsistent with other legal systems does not of course necessarily 
demonstrate that English law is wrong and other systems are right. However, being 
out of step with a large number of other systems should give pause for thought.’ 
 
 A final reason why courts and academics might look to other jurisdictions is second-
order.131 There may be incidental benefits of legal systems adopting the same rule on 
some matter. For example, the preamble to the Rome I Regulation asserts that:132 
 
‘The proper functioning of the internal market creates a need, in order to improve 
the predictability of the outcome of litigation, certainty as to the law applicable and 
the free movement of judgments, for the conflict-of-law rules in the Member 
States to designate the same national law irrespective of the country of the court in 
which an action is brought.’ 
 
This is said to be ‘necessary for the proper functioning of the internal market’.133 These 
propositions are taken to be self-evident; no empirical evidence is provided to support 
them. Whether this is justified is not a question we seek to answer here. Our only point is 
that this is a plausible form of argument in favour of studying comparative law: to 
discover what the law is in a different jurisdiction, and then to adopt a similar rule so as 
to achieve these incidental benefits. 
 There may be additional reasons why a comparative approach is appropriate. 
Whatever the reasons are, it is important that they be stated clearly as they will determine 
the nature of the comparative inquiry. It may be more appropriate for any given court to 
look to the jurisprudence of certain jurisdictions than of other jurisdictions. For example, 
Lionel Smith writes that he would be ‘doubtful of [a] scheme’ that would ‘threaten… to 
cut common law Canada off from the rest of the common law world’.134 We take it that 
his doubt would be less acute if there was the threat of cutting common law Canada off 
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from a civilian jurisdiction (assuming there were harmony between the systems at the 
start of the story). Why, though, should common law countries have any priority? This 
will depend on the reason for the comparative inquiry. If the rationale is that there is a 
common law, the reason is self-evident. If the rationale is epistemic, there is no a priori 
reason to give more weight to common law traditions. But if the rationale is the indirect 
benefits harmonisation brings, there may be more reason to harmonise with other 
common law jurisdictions insofar as (for example) those jurisdictions are ones with 
which England has most trading links. This picture has been complicated of late. Perhaps 
for this reason, Lord Reed says:135 
 
‘Nor is it only common law jurisdictions which should be considered. Particularly 
at a time when steps have begun to be taken towards some degree of 
harmonisation of private law across the European Union, it can sometimes be 
helpful also to consider civilian approaches.’ 
 
IV. The Structure of the Book 
 
In Defences in Tort, we divided the essays into general and specific. We have not replicated 
this structure in this book. Part of the reason for this is that some of the most general 
chapters, such as Dennis Klimchuk’s inquiry into the nature of change of position, deal 
with specific defences. Nevertheless, we have attempted to group together those essays 
which we suggest should be read sequentially, such as the various contributions on the 
change of position defence. We close with an interesting and provocative essay by 
Lord Reed. Lord Reed gave an important opinion in Benedetti v Saiwiris.136 His Lordship 
was struck by the extent to which argument in the case revolved around academic 
interpretations of the law. His chapter here sets out his thoughts on the interrelation 
between academic work and practice—and thus casts light over the book, and project as 
a whole. What is the point of academic work? 137  Should it appeal to judges and 
practitioners?138  
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